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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(a)(1) imposes automatic disclosure and is the most controversial 
formal proposal to revise the Federal Rules ever developed. The 
tProfessor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank.Peggy Sanner for 
valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this 
Essay, and the Harris Trust and Ann & Tom Boone for generous, continuing 
support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed 
here and the errors that remain are mine. 
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provision requires litigants to divulge information that is important 
to their cases before commencing formal discovery. The 
amendment also permits all ninety-four federal districts to vary the 
revision or to reject it completely. Moreover, judges and parties in 
specific cases may modify any disclosure requirements adopted by 
the districts. 
The amendment has remained controversial since it became 
effective on December 1, 1993. Less than a majority of districts 
subscribe to the Federal Rule revision, and many of the remaining 
courts prescribe a broad array of disclosure procedures. These 
procedures include requirements that are somewhat stricter and 
considerably less rigorous than the Federal Rule amendment. 
The applicable strictures, therefore, foster substantial 
interdistrict court and intrastate disuniformity. Moreover, the 
disclosure requirements appear in local rules, civil justice expense 
and delay reduction plans issued under the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA) of 1990, district court orders, individual judge procedures, 
and unwritten informal practices. These considerations complicate 
federal civil practice because the disclosure strictures are difficult to 
locate, understand, and satisfy. Furthermore, they vary significantly 
from district to district and within states. 
All these factors mean that early implementation of automatic 
disclosure warrants analysis. This Essay undertakes that effort by 
emphasizing the process problems raised by disclosure. First, it 
examines the origins and development of the automatic disclosure 
mechanism. The Essay then evaluates the effectuation of disclosure, 
focusing on the disuniform disclosure procedures adopted by the 
federal district courts and the state and territorial court systems 
located within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
This Essay ascertains that disclosure has enhanced interdistrict 
federal court disuniformity. For example, a mere two of the fifteen 
districts subscribe to the Federal Rule requirements. Disclosure has 
also increased intrastate disuniformity. For instance, the federal 
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courts in multi-district states have instituted diverse disclosure 
regimes. Indeed, each of the four federal districts in California 
prescribe different disclosure procedures. Alaska and Arizona are 
the only two of eleven state or territorial court systems that apply 
disclosure. This Essay next assesses the implications of these 
findings regarding the implementation of disclosure, and concludes 
with suggestions for the future. 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AUTOMATIC 
DISCLOSURE PROCEDURE 
Increasing concern about numerous difficulties with discovery 
and its abuse prompted the Federal Advisory Committee on the 
Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) to issue a preliminary draft 
proposal providing for automatic disclosure in 1991.1 The Advisory 
Committee suggestedFRCP 26 (a)(1), which represented a dramatic 
departure from traditional discovery, although minimal empirical 
information indicated that there was widespread discovery abuse, 
and the procedure had received comparatively little prior 
experimentation.2 Passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
1. I rely substantially in this section on Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 
1990fudicialimprovementsActs, 46 STAN.L.REV. 1589, 1609-13 (1994). See, e.g., 
Committee on Discovery, New York State Bar Association Section on 
Commercial and Federal Litigation, Report on Discovery Under Rule 26{b}(1), 127 
F.R.D. 625 (1990); see also Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579; 
Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). 
But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: 1be Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393 (1994). 
2. See Mullenix, supra note 1; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A 
Comment on john Setear's THE BARRISTER AND THE BOMB, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 
(1990); see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery- 1be Rush 
to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 30 {1993) (noting three federal districts had 
experimented with automatic disclosure); Wayne D. Brazil, 7be Adversary 
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 V AND. L. 
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correspondingly evidenced congressional intent that considerable 
testing precede major discovery reform. 3 
The preliminary draft proposal would have mandated that 
plaintiffs and defendants divulge prior to formal discovery 
information that was likely to "bear significantly on any claim or 
defense. "4 Practically all of the more than twenty Early 
Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) designated under the 1990 
legislation that instituted automatic disclosure relied substantially 
on the phrasing in this preliminary draft proposal. 5 
The automatic disclosure amendment ultimately engendered 
greater controversy than any formal proposal to revise the Federal 
Rules. 6 In a lengthy public comment period and in hearings, 
virtually all elements of the organized bar and numerous additional 
interests strongly criticized the preliminary draft proposal.7 These 
opponents thought that the procedure failed to clearly delineate 
disclosure requirements and that it would add an additional layer 
REV. 1295, 1361 (1978) (demonstrating the earliest advocates recommending 
adoption of a national rule only after considerable experimentation); William W. 
Schwarzer, 1be Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Refonn, 50 U. 
PITI. L. REV. 703, 723 (1989). 
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1993) 
(affording guidance to district courts for conducting experimental programs and 
prescribing experimentation with discovery). See generally Carl Tobias, In Defense 
of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1993). 
4. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference 
of the United States Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 
53, 87-88 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. 
5. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 15-16 (1991); U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5, 1991WL525112, at *5 (C.J.R.A.). The dearth 
of disclosure models probably led the districts to depend substantially on the 
phrasing of the Committee's preliminary draft. 
6. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1605. 
7. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 28-32. 
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of discovery, create ethical problems, and impose cost and delay.8 
At the end of a February 1992 public hearing, the Advisory 
Committee decided to omit the disclosure draft, apparently 
choosing to defer the consideration of the procedure until the 
completion of disclosure experimentation, which was ongoing 
under the CJRA in many federal districts.9 The Committee seemed 
to prefer the selective local application of the procedure over the 
national implementation of the controversial, nascent measure.10 
This view was short-lived. In April 1992, the Advisory 
Committee revitalized its preliminary draft and required that 
litigants disclose the names of all individuals who are likely to have 
"discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with 
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the 
information" and "all documents, data compilations, and tangible 
things" that are relevant to disputed facts.11 The Committee 
seemingly attempted to accommodate CJRA experimentation by 
authorizing districts to vary the amendment or to reject it totally.12 
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Evidence (Standing Committee) and the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, additional entities responsible for rule revision, 
approved the Advisory Committee proposal, notwithstanding 
continuing opposition. The United States Supreme Court tendered 
the disclosure amendment without modification to Congress, with 
8. Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, in 145 F.R.D. 139, 
141 {1993); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1612. 
9. See Bell et al:, supra note 2, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 1, at 268; 145 
F.R.D. at 141; see also Randall Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited: 
Committee Debates Further Amendments, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 12. 
10. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 34-35; Sambom, supra note 9, at 12. 
11. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Effective Dec. 1, 
1993, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401-431 (1993) [hereinafter Amendments]. 
12. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 35-39. But see Winter, supra note 1, at 269 
{observing that the revised proposal responded to the legitimate concerns of 
critics). 
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three Justices dissenting from transmittal.13 
Once Congress received the revision, nearly all segments of the 
bar and numerous other interests attempted to persuade Congress 
to omit disclosure.14 Both Houses of Congress conducted hearings 
on the disclosure amendment, and a bill which would have deleted 
disclosure passed the House by voice vote.15 The Senate 
unexpectedly failed to consider the legislation, and the disclosure 
revision took effect on December 1, 1993.16 
The Senate's inaction fostered uncertainty and consternation in 
the federal districts, particularly in the significant number of courts 
attempting to comply with the December deadline by which the 
CJRA mandated that they adopt civil justice expense and delay 
reduction plans and on which the federal disclosure changes became 
effective.17 Because a number of districts believed that Congress 
would omit disclosure, some courts did not anticipate other 
possibilities and needed to make last-minute determinations 
respecting the amendment.18 
These districts and numerous EIDCs, most of which had 
adopted disclosure procedures that varied from the federal 
requirements, 19 responded in diverse ways. Many courts issued or 
13. See Amendments, supra note 11, at 401-03. 
14. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1612. 
15. See William J. Hughes, Reflections from the House: Congressional Reaction 
to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL 
LEGIS.J. 1, 3-4, 9-11 (1993) (discussing hearings); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993) (bill deleting disclosure); 139 CONG. REC. H8744-47 (daily ed. 
Nov. 3, 1993) (passing by voice vote). 
16. See Randall Sambom, Bill to Stop Change Dies: New Discovery Rules Take 
Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40; see also Randall Sam born, Derailing the 
Rules, NAT'LL.J., May 24, 1993, at 1, 33. 
17. See Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 
1994, at 25; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 2074 (Supp. 1993) (providing statutory 
deadlines). 
18. See Tobias, supra note 17, at 25. 
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also DONNA STIENSTRA, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED 
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revised civil justice plans, published orders, or prescribed new or 
amended existing local rules.20 A number of non-EIDCs eschewed 
the federal changes, promulgated provisions that differed from that 
revision, or suspended the federal requirements pending additional 
study. 21 A majority of the districts ultimately chose not to apply the 
new federal modifications. 22 
The above developments engendered confusion in the federal 
districts. Inconsistent procedures complicated practice for federal 
court attorneys and parties, especially for those who litigate in 
more than one district. Many parties encountered problems 
discovering applicable procedures; determining which requirements 
were relevant, what they meant or when the strictures took effect; 
and conforming to disclosure. These complexities even prompted 
calls for moratoria on national rule revision until evaluation of 
local procedural experimentation under the CJRA was concluded.23 
By mid-1994, however, a number of districts had instituted and 
publicized approaches to disclosure that clarified some of the 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1995) (affording survey of 94 districts' treatment of 
disclosure). 
20. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614. 
21. See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 606E (amended Dec. 1, 1993 and Dec. 12, 1994); D. 
ME. R 18(g); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19; John F. Rooney, Discovery Rule 
Lacks Unifonnity, Is "Source of Confasi,on": Critics, CHI. DAILYL. BULL., Apr. 23, 
1994, at 17. Numerous EIDCs retained different forms of disclosure that diverge 
from the federal requirements or continued eschewing disclosure. See, e.g., U.S. 
District Coun for the District of Montana, Order Gan. 25, 1994) [hereinafter 
Montana Order]; U.S. District Coun for the Northern District of Georgia, 
Order (Feb. 26, 1994). 
22. See Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 
1994, at 5; see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19; Rooney, supra note 21. 
23. See Letter from EdwinJ. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New Yark, to Joseph F. Spaniol, 
Jr., Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (Feb. 1, 1992) (on file with author); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Refonn: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 856 {1993). 
1392 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1385 
difficulties. 24 
In short, this assessment of the early implementation of 
automatic disclosure shows that it significantly increased 
inconsistency in federal and state civil procedure while enhancing 
complexity, confusion, expense, and delay. This examination was 
necessarily broad, general, and national. Because greater specificity 
should enhance comprehension of disclosure's effectuation, the next 
section evaluates implementation in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth 
Circuit was chosen because it is the largest circuit geographically, 
encompasses the greatest number of districts, and may confront 
more problems when courts within its purview implement a 
procedure like automatic disclosure. 25 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. Federal District Courts 
A survey of the fifteen federal district courts in the Ninth 
Circuit indicates that they have adopted disclosure measures that 
vary substantially. These range from five districts that prescribe 
whole cloth the Federal Rule amendment, to a like number of 
districts that effectively eschew the federal disclosure requirements 
completely.26 Practically all the remaining districts reject some 
significant aspect of disclosure, such as Rule 26{a){l), which requires 
the disclosure of important information, or Rule 26{t), which 
commands lawyers and litigants to meet and confer, ostensibly 
24. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614-15. 
25. See Arthur D. Hellman, ]umboism and Jurisprudence: 1be 1beory and 
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989). 
26. The five districts prescribing the Federal Rule are Alaska, Arizona, 
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Eastern Washington. The districts 
effectively eschewing it are Eastern and Southern California, Hawaii, Nevada, 
and Western Washington. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 7-24. 
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helping them resolve disagreements.27 
A few of the Early Implementation District Courts that initially 
adopted forms of disclosure premised on the Advisory Committee•s 
1991 preliminary draft proposal continue to apply similar 
procedures.28 An analogous number of EIDCs attempted to 
conform their disclosure requirements more closely to the Federal 
Rule amendment, which became effective on December 1, 1993.29 
Nearly half of the non-EIDCs essentially rejected the Federal Rule 
revision.30 Most of the remaining non-EIDCs that implemented 
automatic disclosure relied substantially on the Federal Rule 
requirements.31 
The federal districts in California and Washington, the two 
states that include multiple districts, also have disparate 
procedures.32 Perhaps most problematic, all four federal districts in 
California have promulgated and enforced different disclosure 
regimes.33 A number of judges in the Northern District of 
California have even applied diverse disclosure procedures to 
specific categories of cases.34 Moreover, judges in a few districts have 
27. These districts include Central California, Hawaii, and Oregon. See 
STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8, 11, 16, 20. 
28. These districts include Eastern California and Oregon. See STIENSTRA, 
supra note 19, at 8, 20; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
29. These districts include Alaska, Idaho, and Montana. See STIENSTRA, supra 
note 19, at 7, 11, 16. 
30. These districts include Hawaii, Nevada, and Western Washington. See 
STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 11, 16, 24. 
31. These districts include Arizona, Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 7, 11, 19. 
32. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9, 24. California has Central, Eastern, 
Northern, and Southern Districts, while Washington has Eastern and Western 
Districts. 
33. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9; see also note 57 infra and 
accompanying text (finding that the Second Circuit's four New York Districts 
have fewer discrepancies in disclosure procedures). 
34. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 17-22 
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employed different disclosure requirements within their districts. 35 
Most of the EIDCs indicated which disclosure procedures 
would apply by issuing general or special orders announcing their 
disposition,36 while a f~w courts amended applicable local rules or 
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans or intimated that 
they would probably do so after additional study of the new federal 
changes. 37 Lawyers and litigants, especially attorneys and parties 
who were located outside of specific districts, may have 
encountered difficulty securing these orders. For instance, the 
Montana District circulated a Uniform Order to members of the 
Federal Bar in January 1994. The order was intended to tailor the 
court's disclosure requirements more precisely to the 1993 Federal 
Rule modification.38 The order was also meant to be temporary, 
pending the receipt of recommendations for improving civil justice 
reform from the CJRA Advisory Group and the completion of the· 
court's annual assessment.39 
The Judicial Improvements Act GIA) of 1988 imposes an 
affirmative obligation on circuit judicial councils to periodically 
review all local procedures for consistency with the Federal Rules. 
The Act further authorizes the councils to abrogate or modify any 
conflicting requirements.40 The 1990 CJRA correspondingly assigns 
{1991); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9. 
35. For example, judicial officers in the divisions of the Montana District 
either do not apply automatic disclosure or they enforce judicial disclosure 
differently. See Carl Tobias, Updating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54 
MONT. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil justice 
Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 362 {1993). 
36. See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, 
General Order No. 394-E (Nov. 8, 1993); Montana Order, supra note 21. 
37. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. Loe. R. 253; D. IDAHO Loe. R. 26.1-.2. 
38. See Montana Order, supra note 21. 
39. See Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for 
the District of Montana, to members of the Federal Bar Q"an. 25, 1994); see also 
D. MONT. Loe. R. 200-205 (governing discovery that became effective on 
September 1, 1995). 
40. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 322(d)(4), 2071(a), 2071(c)(1) (Supp. 1993); see also FED. 
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similar oversight duties to circuit review committees, placing fewer 
regulatory responsibilities on them.41 Although the Ninth Circuit 
Court Review Committee rigorously monitored districts' 
implementation of the CJRA 42 and the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Council attempted to carefully discharge its JIA responsibilities,43 
neither Ninth Circuit entity disapproved numerous districts' 
adoption of inconsistent automatic disclosure procedures.44 
Several plausible reasons explain the Ninth Circuit's inaction. 
First, the 1993 Federal Rule revision specifically invited districts to 
adopt and enforce conflicting local procedures and even to eschew 
totally the federal amendment.45 Second, the CJRA's eleven 
statutorily-prescribed principles, guidelines, and techniques, which 
districts were to consider and could promulgate, and the twelfth 
provision empowering courts to apply any other measures that 
would reduce cost or delay, expressly encouraged districts to 
implement local requirements that departed from the Federal Rules 
and provisions in the United States Code.46 Third, it is likely that 
R. CIV. P. 83 (proscribing inconsistency). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 
1598-99 (discussing statutory requirements and implementation). 
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. 1993); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice 
Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 
1406-09 (1992) (discussing statutory requirements and implementation of 28 
U.S.C. § 474(a)). 
42. See Tobias, supra note 41, at 1408 n.78. 
43. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 
52 \XT ASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 {1995). 
44. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 1, at 1618 n.88 (committee did not disapprove 
of inconsistent disclosure procedures); Tobias, supra note 43 (showing that 
council did not disapprove of inconsistent disclosure procedures); see also U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sb..-th Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial 
Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994) (voting to suspend monitoring of local procedures 
under the 1988 Act pending the receipt of additional guidance from Congress, 
the Judicial Conference, or case law as to whether the CJRA's provisions take 
precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
45. See Amendments, supra note 11, at 431-32. 
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1993). 
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Congress, in assigning oversight duties to committees, failed to 
authorize the committees to require that districts abolish or alter 
inconsistent procedures. 47 
B. State and Territorial Courts 
Review of the eleven state and territorial courts in the Ninth 
Circuit shows that the Alaska and Arizona state court systems are 
the only systems that have adopted automatic disclosure. 48 Indeed, 
Arizona prescribed disclosure before the Federal Rule revision 
became effective. 49 Procedural policymakers in that state apparently 
believed that discovery required such substantial reform that it was 
preferable to apply procedures analogous to the comparatively 
untested disclosure requirements included in the federal 
preliminary draft.so Arizona is also a jurisdiction that has seemingly 
concluded that maintaining uniform civil procedures in federal and 
state courts is critically important.st The Alaska state court system 
seriously considered implementing a form of automatic disclosure 
premised on the federal model and formally adopted a disclosure 
procedure that became effective on July 15, 1993.s2 
It is unclear why the remaining state and territorial court 
systems failed to effectuate automatic disclosure. Some jurisdictions 
47. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
48. See ARIZ. R. av. P. 26.1, ALA. R. Crv. P. 26; see also Thomas A. Zlaket, 
Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1 (1993). California makes limited provision for disclosure. See CAL. CODE Crv. 
P. § 1141.11. 
49. Arizona's disclosure regime became effective on July 1, 1992 under ARIZ. 
R. Crv. P. 26.1, while the federal regime took effect on December 1, 1993. 
Compare Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 11 (1993) with Amendments, supra note 11, at 401. 
50. See Myers, supra note 49, at 11-13; see also supra note 4 and accompanying 
text (discussing federal preliminary draft proposal). 
51. See John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2059 (1989). 
52. See ALA. R. Crv. P. 26. 
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reached no affirmative decision to reject disclosure, while few states 
have indicated that they will refuse to employ disclosure. It appears 
that most jurisdictions assume a cautious approach to disclosure. 
The position of the Montana Advisory Commission on the 
Civil Rules, which is the state analogue of the Federal Advisory 
Committee, seems typical and perhaps representative.53 The 
Commission suggested to the Montana Supreme Court that it delay 
the adoption of any disclosure procedure for the state court 
system. 54 The Commission premised its view on virtually 
unanimous bar opposition to the federal revision and the 
amendment's highly controversial nature.55 The Commission 
apparently thought that Montana should not prescribe a procedure 
that had yet to prove efficacious at the federal level, and that 
Montana could always institute disclosure if experimentation in 
federal districts and other states indicated that a specific disclosure 
mechanism was effective. 56 
C. A Look at Other Circuits 
This survey of automatic disclosure in the Ninth Circuit seems 
typical and may well be paradigmatic. An impressionistic review of 
most other circuits shows that districts within their purview have 
adopted equally disparate approaches to automatic disclosure. For 
example, in the Second Circuit, the four New York districts have 
prescribed disclosure regimes that are more compatible than those 
53. Carl Tobias, An Update on the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments and the 
Montana Civil Rules, 56 MONT. L. REV. 547 (1995). 
54. Telephone conversation with Randy Cox, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, 
Missoula, MT, Member, Montana Advisory Commission on Civil Rules (Oct. 
25, 1994). 
55. Remarks of William H. Bellingham, Chair, Montana Advisory 
Commission on Civil Rules, to Montana Defense Trial Lawyers Continuing 
Legal Education Program on the 1993 Federal Amendments, Kalispell, MT Guly 
14, 1994); see also telephone conversation, supra note 54. 
56. See Tobias, supra note 53. 
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prescribed in the California districts.57 Very few state court systems 
have correspondingly subscribed to automatic disclosure. Maryland 
apparently is the only jurisdiction other than Arizona that has 
actually adopted and implemented disclosure. 58 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS REGARDING AUTOMATIC 
DISCLOSURE 
The Federal Rule amendment imposing automatic disclosure 
has significantly enhanced interdistrict court disuniformity. The 
applicable disclosure requirements are concomitantly difficult to 
find, understand, and satisfy. These phenomena disadvantage all 
lawyers and litigants. However, the requirements particularly affect 
attorneys and parties, such as the Department of Justice, large 
corporations, and the Sierra Club, who litigate in multiple districts 
and are located outside specific districts.59 Even when local 
procedural strictures do not mandate the retention of local 
counsel,60 prudence and pragmatic factors may so dictate. For 
instance, lawyers who practice in the district may better appreciate 
how local judges will actually interpret and enforce disclosure 
procedures as written. 61 
Disclosure has increased intrastate disuniformity in the Ninth 
Circuit because federal districts in the two states that encompass 
more than one district prescribe different procedures, while only 
two state or territorial systems subscribe to disclosure. The erosion 
57. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9, 17-18. 
58. See MD. R. CIV. P. 2-403 (1994). 
59. See Tobias, supra note 41, at 1422-27; see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and 
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89). 
60. See Daniel R. Coquillette et al., 7be Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J., Jan. 
1989, at 62, 64-65; see also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987). 
61. Lawyers who practice in the district will better understand the local legal 
culture. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and 
the Control of Litigation, 27 LAW &SOC'YREV. 535 (1993); see also Tobias, supra 
note 41, at 1422-27. 
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of uniformity complicates the efforts of attorneys to practice in 
both federal and state court in specific jurisdictions and enhances 
the complexity and expense of federal and state civil litigation. 
Disuniformity also means that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure decreasingly serve as a model for the states. This 
phenomenon increasingly undermines the expectations of the 
lawyers who drafted the 1938 Federal Ruies. They anticipated that 
state court systems would prescribe procedures analogous to 
Federal requirements, thereby promoting intrastate uniformity and 
simplifying legal practice. 62 
The reduced uniformity, enhanced complexity, greater 
uncertainty, and potential for increased cost and delay that have 
apparently attended automatic disclosure's application and other 
aspects of the CJRA's implementation have influenced forum 
choices in some jurisdictions.63 For instance, plaintiffs' counsel 
prefer to pursue litigation in state court because the simpler 
requirements expedite resolution. Defense lawyers correspondingly 
choose not to remove to federal court suits out of concern about 
expense, delay, and complexity. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Generic Recommendation 
The above analysis shows that the interdistrict court and 
intrastate disuniformity created by the automatic disclosure 
procedure has imposed numerous disadvantages. Most important, 
disclosure has complicated federal and state civil practice and has 
increased cost and delay. These factors lead me to proffer the 
62. See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 
A.B.A. J. 1648, 1650-51 (1981); see also Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-77 {1989). 
63. See Carl Tobias, Opt-Outs at the Outlaw Inn: A Report from Montana, 14 
REV. LmG. 207, 212 {1994). 
1400 THE WAYNELAWREVIEW [Vol. 41:1385 
general recommendation that decisionmakers who develop and 
apply federal and state civil procedures attempt to implement the 
most uniform and simple disclosure requirements. This suggestion 
correspondingly prompts more specific recommendations for those 
policymakers. 
B. Specific Suggestions for Federal Decisionmakers 
1. Short-Term Recommendations 
Numerous immediate actions that federal procedural decision-
makers could institute must, as a practical matter, await the 
conclusion of experimentation under the CJRA and its 
comprehensive evaluation. 64 A number of courts that are not 
EIDCs have been employing disclosure measures for less than two 
years, and relatively little implementation of disclosure in EIDCs 
has been rigorously assessed. 65 
The RAND Corporation is presently conducting a thorough 
analysis of CJRA experimentation with six principles and 
guidelines of cost and delay reduction in ten pilot districts and ten 
comparison courts which the company plans to complete during 
mid-1996.66 The Judicial Conference will submit to Congress a 
64. Insofar as these suggestions are aimed at decisionmakers in the circuits, 
they rely on examples drawn from the Ninth Circuit. The recommendations are 
intended to apply equally to decisionmakers in other circuits who can 
extrapolate from the suggestions. 
65. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614-16; see also infra note 82 and accom-
panying text. 
66. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c)(1), 
(2)(A)-{C), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (1990) (discussing the pilot districts and CJRA 
experimentation); see also Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (1994), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1994) 
(extending deadline from mid-1995 to mid-1996). See generally Carl Tobias, 
Extending the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 
(1995). 
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report and recommendations on that pilot program by the end of 
1996,67 while Congress must ultimately decide how to treat the civil 
justice reform effort. 68 These factors mean that the Advisory 
Committee could probably not propose adoption of one disclosure 
procedure so soon after the 1993 Federal disclosure amendment's 
promulgation, especially given the pragmatic political realities that 
require Committee deference to congressional resolution of the 
CJRA. 
Federal procedural policymakers might institute some actions, 
however. Individual federal districts and judges can attempt to 
implement and apply the most uniform, simple disclosure regimes. 
For example, the federal districts in California and Washington 
could make disclosure requirements in the federal courts more 
uniform.69 Judges in the Northern District of California might 
correspondingly prescribe fewer disclosure systems, although their 
efforts may constitute a valuable attempt to experiment with the 
procedure in different contexts.70 
67. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105{c), supra note 66, at 5098; 
see also Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, § 4, supra note 66, at 4345 {extending 
deadline from end of 1995 to end of 1996). The Conference must also submit to 
Congress a report on the demonstration districts by the end of 1995. See Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, §104(d) supra note 66, at 5097. Congress has extended 
the date until the end of 1996. See S. REP. No. 464, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
Neither the Conference's two reports nor the RAND study focus on or 
rigorously evaluate disclosure. All three accord disclosure some consideration, 
while annual assessments of experimentation in the districts examine disclosure. 
These efforts, therefore, may support tentative conclusions regarding disclosure's 
efficacy. 
68. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(b) supra note 66, at 5097-
98. 
69. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. I recognize that differing 
local legal cultures in the districts may suggest the propriety of diverse disclosure 
procedures. I also do not underestimate the importance of Article ill judges' 
independence as a potential obstacle to changes such as the ones that I suggest. 
70. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The need for change may also 
be a function of judges' and lawyers' tolerance for experimentation and 
inconsistency, both of which have traditionally been rather high in this district 
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A general improvement that many federal districts and judges 
can easily effectuate is to increase the accessibility of the applicable 
disclosure requirements. For instance, courts and judges could 
include more disclosure procedures in local rules, or at least explore 
ways of effectively communicating the strictures' application to 
federal court practitioners and litigants. 
The circuit judicial councils and circuit review committees 
might promote the adoption of uniform disclosure measures by 
abrogating or changing inconsistent local disclosure requirements 
or urging federal districts or judges to abolish or modify them.71 
-However, the councils and committees may be justifiably reluctant 
to exercise power that appears to be regulatory or to infringe on 
federal judges' prerogatives, particularly when the CJRA and the 
1993 federal disclosure amendment seem to authorize 
inconsistency.72 
The national rule revisors, especially the Advisory Committee, 
should begin searching for a single automatic disclosure procedure 
that can be included in the Federal Rule as soon as the ongoing 
application and analysis of the multitude of disclosure mechanisms 
currently receiving experimentation indicate that one technique is 
superior. The Committee might draw specifically on the annual 
assessments that numerous districts have prepared.73 
which enjoys a laudable reputation for experimentation. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. 
R., N.D. CAL., Crv. L.R. 235-37, available in WL CA Rules; see also Robert F. 
Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case 
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 773-79 (1981). 
71. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
73. For example, nearly all of the EIDCs have performed at least one annual 
assessment. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
GEORGIA, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S 
DOCK.ET, 1993 WL 52 4466 (C.J.R.A.); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OI-nO, ANNUALAssESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
DOCKET, 1993 WL 319599 (C.J.R.A.); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 1993) 
(prescribing annual assessments). 
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Definitive conclusions regarding disclosure's effectiveness are 
difficult to posit at this juncture. Nevertheless, it now appears that 
the Southern District of Illinois "procedure," requiring litigants to 
divulge the identify of persons "reasonably likely to have 
information that bears significantly on the claims and defenses," has 
worked well.74 The Montana District initially prescribed disclosure 
strictures that were intentionally more rigorous than the federal 
preliminary draft proposal, mandating, for example, that parties 
reveal the factual premise and legal theory of every claim.75 This 
procedure seems to function smoothly in comparatively simple, 
routine suits and when the disclosure has been general.76 
The Judicial Conference should similarly attempt to delineate 
one preferable disclosure approach as it continues work on its 
report and recommendation to Congress, which will rely 
significantly on the RAND Corporation findings.77 The 
Conference should collect, analyze, and synthesize all relevant 
information on disclosure's application and evaluation. The annual 
assessments performed in EIDCs that adopted disclosure should be 
a helpful source. ' 
Although it is difficult to reach conclusive determinations 
respecting disclosure's efficacy, educated predictions can be 
premi~ed on experimentation and analysis to date. This material 
suggests that the Conference will recommend national adoption of 
7 4. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IilINOIS, 
CIVILJUSTICEDELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 11, 1991WL525127 
(C.J.R.A.); see also Rooney, supra note 21, at 17. 
75. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, supra note 
5, at 16-17 (1991); see also Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Reform in 
Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 363 (1993); supra notes 29, 38-39 and 
accompanying text. 
76. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 363. Unfortunately, discovery poses the 
greatest difficulty and requires the most effective reform in complex cases. See 
Winter, supra note 1, at 268. 
77. See Tobias, supra note 66, at 20; see also supra notes 66-67 and 
accompanying text. 
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the disclosure procedure that has proved most effective at that 
time.78 If the data assembled, evaluated, and synthesized between 
now and the date when the Conference must report to Congress is 
inconclusive, the Conference should consider developing other 
alternatives, such as limited additional testing of those disclosure 
mechanisms that seem most efficacious.79 
Congress can continue planning for the Judicial Conference's 
submission of the report and recommendation in anticipation of 
legislative decisionmaking relating to the CJRA. However, 
Congress may need to await the results of the RAND study and the 
Conference report and recommendation before it can meaningfully 
treat disclosure. For instance, the above examination indicated that 
the Conference would probably propose nationwide prescription 
of a single disclosure procedure. 80 Should the information that 
subsequently becomes available suggest the propriety of this 
approach, Congress should ratify it. If the material indicates 
otherwise or is less clear, thereby leading the Conference to 
different conclusions, the Congress should examine additional 
courses of action, including selective, future experimentation with 
promising disclosure techniques. 
Congress might also consider measures that it can immediately 
institute to increase automatic disclosure's uniformity and 
simplicity, although Congress apparently has few such options. 
Congress should forgo the revival of the legislation that would have 
omitted disclosure from the 1993 Federal Rules amendments.81 
Revitalization is inadvisable and would prove counterproductive 
principally because it will disrupt ongoing experimentation before 
more definitive conclusions regarding disclosure's effectiveness can 
be formulated. 
78. See also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c), supra note 66, at 
5098 (prescribing similar process for Conference recommendation). 
79. See supra note 78; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1627-28. 
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, all procedural decisionmakers should explore ways of 
rigorously evaluating experimentation with automatic disclosure. 
Numerous annual assessments have discussed disclosure, but few 
analyses have been particularly stringent, and a number have 
yielded inconclusive results respecting efficacy.82 The RAND study 
has not emphasized disclosure, and some of the pilot and 
comparison districts are not even applying the mechanism. 83 The 
Congress or the Judicial Conference might commission RAND to 
expand its evaluation, thereby focusing more specifically on 
disclosure, or the Conference could charge the Federal Judicial 
Center to perform an assessment of disclosure. 
2. Long-Term Recommendations 
Several long-term suggestions can be derived from the 
experimentation with automatic disclosure, although most of the 
recommendations are not specific to that procedure. Federal 
districts and individual judges must be attentive to the 
complications of procedural inconsistency that disclosure 
exemplifies. For example, the courts and judges should abrogate all 
conflicting local procedures, embody the maximum number of 
remaining requirements in local rules, and commit to writing every 
local procedure. 84 Circuit judicial councils should systematically 
discharge their duties to periodically review, abolish, or alter any 
local procedures deemed inconsistent. 85 This suggestion realistically 
82. The first assertion is premised on my review of most of the assessments. 
Examples of inconclusive results appear in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
GROUP OF 1HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 1HE EASTERN DISTRICT 
OFPENNSYLVANIA6-8Q"une1993); REPORTON1HE!MPACTOFTHECOST AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN ADOPTED BY 1HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THESOU1HERNDISTRICTOFTEXAS 13-17 (Apr. 6, 1993), 1993 WL 468314 
(C.J.R.A.). 
83. See supra note 66. 
84. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1626-28; Tobias, supra note 63, nn.217-18. 
85. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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applies to council review of procedures prescribed under the CJRA 
only after the CJRA has sunset and to disclosure only in the long-
term. 86 
The national rule revisers, particularly the Advisory 
Committee, should attempt to reinstitute a national uniform 
procedural system. Significant to the achievement of this objective 
will be the substitution of a proposed 1991 revision to Rule 83, 
which was retracted in deference to civil justice reform 
experimentation, for the local option provision that automatic 
dis~losure specifically illustrates. 87 
The national revision entities must also be more cautious about 
developing controversial Federal Rules amendments such as 
automatic disclosure. The disclosure experience indicates that state 
court policymakers will be reluctant to adopt similar measures until 
they exhibit promise. The national rule revisers should prescribe 
procedural changes only after thorough experimentation and 
rigorous evaluation through empirical data collection that shows 
that the mechanisms are efficacious. 88 The national entities should 
correspondingly create a more effective vehicle for conducting 
experimentation that could be premised on the recently withdrawn 
86. For explanations of why the suggestion only applies to disclosure in the 
long-term, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (explaining why 
suggestion only applies to councils after CJRA sunsets). Numerous councils may 
also require congressional funding to implement this aspect of the 1988 JIA. See 
Tobias, supra note 43, at 364. 
87. The proposal empowered districts with Judicial Conference approval to 
adopt for not greater than five years experimental local rules which contravene 
Federal Rules. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of ProposedAmendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 
53, 152 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32; Bell et al., supra note 2, 
at 35-39. But see Winter, supra note 1, at 269. 
88. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transfonnation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989). 
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proposal to amend Rule 83.89 
C. Specific Suggestions for State Decisionmakers 
State court procedural decisionmakers considering disclosure 
apparently have few tenable options.9° For example, the 
policymakers can adopt the controversial federal disclosure 
provision that has not yet proved efficacious, prescribe no 
disclosure procedure, or experiment with disclosure measures that 
depart from the federal requirements. The two latter alternatives 
would increase intrastate disuniformity, except in jurisdictions that 
model their disclosure requirements on those of the federal districts 
located therein. 
Some state court systems may want to undertake 
experimentation with disclosure. These jurisdictions should survey 
the different procedures being applied throughout the federal 
system, assess their own local legal cultures, and ascertain which 
measures promise to be most effective. The states should also 
remember the disclosure procedures applied by the federal districts 
in the jurisdiction and attempt to conform state requirements 
closely to the federal strictures. States that are uncertain about those 
disclosure procedures that will be most efficacious could prescribe 
selective experimentation in speCific local courts or by particular 
case types.91 States should also institute rigorous evaluation of any 
experimentation initiated so that the best mechanisms can 
ultimately be identified.92 
89. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local 
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 
{1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted 
Field Expe-timents, LAW & CONTEMP. PRO BS., Summer 1988, at 67. 
90. Because they have so few choices, I have combined short- and long-term 
suggestions. 
91. For instance, experimentation with disclosure might be more appropriate 
in urban or rural districts or in simple or complex cases. 
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also supra note 65 and 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This study of automatic disclosure in the Ninth Circuit 
indicates that the procedure promoted interdistrict court and 
intrastate disuniformity. Institutions and individuals, such as 
Congress, the Federal Advisory Committee, federal districts and 
judges, and state judges who are responsible for maintaining civil 
procedures that are uniform and simple, must now act 
expeditiously and effectively to limit the disuniformity that · 
disclosure is fostering. 
accompanying text. Federal and state procedural decisionmakers should probably 
employ federal-state judicial councils as vehicles for cooperating and for 
increasing intrastate uniformity of disclosure and other civil procedures. 
